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Abstract
This paper analyses two features of concern to policy-makers in the countries 
of the prospective European Monetary Union: the solvency of their governments 
finances; and the accuracy of fiscal forecasts. Extending the existing methodol­
ogy of solvency tests, the paper finds that, with few exceptions, EU governments 
are insolvent, albeit debt/GDP ratios show signs of stabilizing. The accuracy 
of official short-term fiscal forecasts (those of the OECD) is analysed using con­
ventional techniques and found to be reassuring.
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Fiscal issues have come to command first-order importance in the discussion o f eco­
nomic policy in the prospective European Monetary Union. At the official level concern 
for these issues has been seen in the provisions of the 1992 Treaty of European Union 
(Maastricht Treaty), which set out as convergence criteria inter alia, a reference value 
for the budget deficit in ratio to GDP of 3 per cent and for the ratio of government 
debt to GDP a value of 60 per cent. The Stability and Growth Pact of 1997 carries 
the Maastricht provisions through to the operation of the Monetary Union itself, rein­
forcing the “excessive deficit procedure” set out in the Treaty and inter alia calling on 
Member States to “commit themselves to respect the medium-term budgetary position 
of close to balance or in surplus set out in their stability or convergence programmes” 
(European Council, 1997).
The economic rationale for the inclusion of the fiscal criteria in the Treaty among 
the convergence requirements has been much discussed (see, for example, Buiter and 
Kletzer (1992) and Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1992)), whilst the provisions of the 
Stability and Growth Pact have also been hotly debated (Artis and Winkler (1997) 
attempt a review). Certain points are clear and relatively uncontroversial, however. 
In particular, as far as debt/G D P ratios are concerned, the move to monetary union 
raises question marks about the sustainability of debt/G DP ratios at previous, or 
even at much-reduced levels: as Mongelli (1996) has pointed out, within the frame­
work of European Monetary Union (EMU) member states lose the power of money 
creation with which to guarantee the repayment of their debts, whilst at the same 
time these same member states face increasing restrictions on their taxing powers due 
to the rising mobility of tax bases within the Union. Further, participation in EMU 
itself, with the added pressure this will bring on remaining obstacles to the free flow 
of finance and financial services within the euro-zone and the greater transparency 
imparted to transactions, is likely to liberate investors from captive home markets. In 
these circumstances it is not difficult to appreciate the point that McKinnon is mak­
ing when he draws attention (McKinnon, 1996, chapter 19) to the disparity between 
national debt/G D P ratios in Europe (even at Maastricht-levels of 60 per cent) and 
the comparable debt/State product ratios in the United States (which are nearer to 



























































































GDP is sustainable; the transition from the Maastricht 60 per cent debt ratio with a 
3 per cent interest-inclusive deficit limit to the Stability and Growth Pacts emphasis 
on a target of a zero or surplus (interest-inclusive) budget balance in the medium 
run is perhaps indicative of this concern. A fresh examination of the solvency of EU 
government finances is equally justified and it is such an examination which occupies 
the first part of this paper.
Since solvency is literally the condition that future primary surpluses can be fore­
seen which are sufficient to repay all existent (and any future) debt, this might seem 
at first sight a rather stringent criterion to implement. However, it has to be conceded 
that solvency, as judged by the behaviour of fiscal variables within the sample period, 
is by no means a sufficient condition for pronouncing the government finances healthy 
(or otherwise), and can only be regarded as an indication in this respect. In particular, 
solvency is in essence a forward-looking concept. The future path of fiscal policy may 
not, due to a regime change, resemble that of the sample period; a regime change that 
has taken place only near the end of the sample may not have sufficient weight, when 
pooled with earlier observations, to produce the ’’ correct ' verdict on the solvency of 
the State1. In these respects solvency analysis is very much a first step, and one that 
needs to be accompanied by other forms of analysis. In particular, as Perotti et al. 
(1997) stress, controllability is a key issue. They place their emphasis on searching for 
the causes of fiscal errors and on reform of the fiscal process to check these, though 
in doing so they start from Maastricht deficit and debt ratio criteria.. These latter 
have no particular analytical basis, other than being consistent with one another on 
reasonable assumptions about growth and inflation. A bottom-line justification for 
the solvency criterion, by contrast, is that its meaning is unambiguous, at least, in 
principle.
Current arrangements provide for the identification of potential EMU members to 
take place in April 1998 on the basis of out-turn data for 1997; but it is clear that 
fiscal forecasts for further years will play a role in determining whether those out-turns 
reflect durable and credible achievements, as required by both the Maastricht Treaty
1 Hansen et al. (1991) conclude that the intertemporal budget balance condition yields no use­
ful restrictions. But they reach this conclusion on the basis o f additional assumptions which are 




























































































and the resolution o f the German Parliament2 which governs Germanys acceptance of 
partner countries in the European Monetary Union. Thus fiscal forecasting accuracy 
is at a premium. In the latter part of this paper we address directly the question of 
the accuracy of official fiscal forecasts - in this case, those of the OECD.
The data base used in this study and some of its concerns resemble those in Uctum 
and Wickens (1997). As do these authors, we also use data derived from the OECD 
with some, mostly minor, differences. We also share a concern for testing intertemporal 
budget constraints - in our case, exclusively for solvency (infinite horizon) whilst in 
their case the emphasis is on testing for sustainability (finite horizon achievement 
o f specified debt/G D P positions). Whilst Uctum and Wickens incorporate forecast 
values in the sample they analyse for sustainability, we test for the accuracy of these 
(or related) forecasts.
2. The evolution of debt
A test for solvency is simply a check on whether debt can be repaid. So the solvency 
condition for government debt requires that there be a prospect for future budget 
surpluses sufficient to pay off current debt. To clarify these points, some algebra will 
be useful.
The accounting identity describing the evolution of government debt at constant 
prices is
Bt =  (1 +  — St, (2.1)
where Bt and St indicate the debt and primary surplus inclusive of seigniorage, while 
rt is the real interest rate. Assuming that rt >  0 in all time periods, (2.1) is an 
unstable non-homogenous difference equation which can be solved forward to yield
)S t+s 1 > (2.2)
where Et is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time t. 
When
Bt+n -);Et (n(T■ +  rt+3 ■ o, (2.3)




























































































the debt at time t equals the sum of discounted future surpluses, the intertemporal 
government budget constraint is satisfied, and the solvency condition (or no Ponzi 
game condition) is met. The government will not then be indulging in perpetual debt 
refinancing.
Several proposals have been put forward in the literature to test whether gov­
ernment debt histories meet this condition. They are briefly reviewed in the first 
subsection, while in the second one we present the econometric methodology that will 
be followed in the paper.
2.1. Literature review
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) assume a constant real interest rate. r. and maintain an 
assumption that the deviation of the debt from the sum of discounted future surpluses 
grows at the rate r. In this case (2.2) would become
B t =  c ( l  +  r )1 +  £ ( 1  +  r )-*£ ,(£ ,+ ,) . (2.4)
S=1
and the intertemporal budget constraint would only be satisfied if c =  0. They suggest 
three procedures for testing whether c =  0. The first one relies on the observation 
that if both the debt and the sum of discounted surpluses are stationary, then indeed 
c =  0.3 The other ones are tests for the significance of (1 4- r ) ‘  in the regression 
equation which is obtained after substituting the expected values in (2,4) with alter­
native extrapolative approximations. When applied to annual US data for the period 
1960-1984, the hypothesis that c =  0 cannot be rejected by any methods, providing 
support for the validity of the intertemporal budget constraint. A similar conclusion 
is achieved by Haug (1990), with quarterly data for the period 1960-1987.
W ilcox (1989) relaxes the assumption of a constant interest rate. He discounts the 
variables back to period zero, so that we rewrite equation (2.1) as
QtBt =  — QtSt, (2-5)
3ccan  be equal to zero even if both the debt and the sum of discounted surpluses are 1(1} variables, 
but they are cointegrated with a cointegration vector equal to (1,-1). Smith and Zin (1991), using 
monthly data for Canada for the period 1946:1-1984:12 and assuming that the surplus follows an 






























































































Equation (2.2) then becomes
OO
qtBt =  nlirn Et(ql+nB,+n) +  £  EMjSj) (2.7)
S = 1
and the relevant issue for solvency is whether the infinite horizon forecast of the 
discounted debt, the first term on the right hand side of (2.7), is equal to zero or not. 
As we will see in more detail in the next section, a necessary condition for the limit 
to exist is that the discounted debt is not integrated of order one, 1(1), while the 
expectation is equal to zero if the variable is stationary and its unconditional mean 
is equal to zero. Both these hypotheses are rejected by Wilcox, using unit root tests 
with the Hamilton and Flavin (1986) dataset.
Ahmed and Rogers (1995) show that under mild conditions the first term on the 
right hand side of (2.7) is equal to zero if and only if the deficit inclusive of interest 
payments is a zero mean stationary process. If receipts (T), expenditures (G), and 
interest payments are 1(1) variables, the latter condition is satisfied if and only if
is a cointegration relationship. Hence, they test for cointegration using a very long 
sample (1792-1992 for the US and 1692-1992 for the UK), and accept this hypothesis. 
Similar results were obtained by Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991), while Hakkio and 
Rush (1991) rejected cointegration over the period 1975-1988 with quarterly data.
where b and s are the debt and surplus to gdp ratios, g is the rate of growth, while d. 
the discount factor, is now
T t ~ G t —
Other authors have focused on the behaviour of the debt to gdp ratio. This seems 
natural in a growth economy. In this case (2.5) can be rewritten as































































































dtbt =  l̂irn Et(dt+nbt+n) +  ^  Et{djSj), (2.10)
3=1
and the transversality condition
Urn Et(dt+n6e+n) =  0 (2.11)
is satisfied if dt+nbt+n is a stationary zero mean process. Uctum and Wickens (1997) 
test for the validity of (2.11) using unit root tests with annual data for the period 
1965-1994 and get mixed results for EU countries, while its validity is rejected for the 
US. The latter result contrasts with the finding of a bounded debt to gnp ratio by 
Kremers (1989).
Notice that convergence to zero of the discounted debt ratio is in general not 
sufficient for convergence of the undiscounted ratio. Actually, if the debt ratio is 
positive and we consider r — g  as a random variable with positive support whose lower 
bound is r — g , it is
dt+n < r - f f (,+n)
and
Et(dt+nbt+n) < r  -  g - ^ E t j b , ^ ) .
The term r — ff~(t+n) converges to zero exponentially, so that the discounted debt 
ratio can converge to zero even if the undiscounted ratio diverges at a lower than 
exponential rate. This suggests that both quantities should be analysed and not only 
the discounted one.
Equations (2.1), (2.5), and (2.8) can be also used to track the behaviour of debt, 
possibly discounted or as a ratio of gdp, over a finite horizon. This is particularly 
relevant when there is a medium term target in terms of a certain level o f debt, and 
it is o f interest to evaluate whether the current economic policy will allow the target 
be achieved or not. For example, from (2.8), the expected value of the debt ratio in 
period t +  m  is
Et(dnmbt f m ) —  dtbt ^  ' Et(djSj) .
s=1
From this formula, given a desired value for dt+mbt+m and a future path for expendi­




























































































which is expected to satisfy the target. If the current expected path of receipts already 
satisfies the target, the policy is usually said to be sustainable.
It is also possible to construct indicators of fiscal sustainability based on the di­
vergence between current and required fiscal paths, see for example Blanchard et al. 
(1990) or Mongelli (1996). In this case the crucial element is the formulation of expec­
tations on the future path of relevant variables such as growth, inflation and interest 
rates. One possibility is to construct time series models for these variables and use 
them for forecasting future values, see e.g. Chouraqui et al. (1986). As an alternative, 
official forecasts can be used, as e.g. in Wickens and Uctum (1997). These authors 
show that, even in those EU countries where the solvency condition is satisfied,, cur­
rent fiscal policy may prove unsustainable, in the sense of being inconsistent with the 
achievement of a particular debt ceiling by a given short-medium term target date; 
the required fiscal contraction can be rather substantial.
2.2. Econometric methodology
The main statistical result that can be derived from the previous subsection is that, 
once the proper debt measure is chosen, the validity of the transversality (solvency) 
condition requires the debt measure to be a stationary zero mean random variable. 
The alternative procedures which have been suggested in the literature and some 
new ones that we propose below, all aim at testing this hypothesis. It is useful to 
distinguish five sets of tools for the analysis of the debt ratio.
1. Descriptive analysis. A graph of the evolution of the debt measure over time 
can provide a first indication about its stationarity around a zero mean, besides 
conveying useful information on the existence of structural breaks in the series. 
The shape of the correlogram is also a useful indicator. For the variable to be 
stationary, it should decay rapidly, starting from a relatively low value. More­
over, if the debt measure is stationary, differencing will induce a unit moving 
average root, so that the spectrum of the first difference of the variable, i.e. the 
deficit , should be equal to zero at frequency zero.
2. Unit root tests. These are the most common tool for testing for stationarity of 




























































































the results to the choice of the deterministic component and of the lag length (or 
of the band-width for spectral based tests) (e.g. Schwert (1989)), the low power 
in finite samples (e.g. Podivinski (1997)), and the bias in the results if there are 
structural breaks (e.g. Perron (1989)), a subtle but important statistical issue 
should be recalled because it is usually overlooked when interpreting the results. 
Since we are interested in testing for stationarity of the debt measure, it is this 
that should be the null hypothesis of the test, while the null hypothesis of the 
usually adopted unit root tests, e.g. the ADF test or the Phillips test, is that 
the variable is non-stationary, 1(1) in particular. Moreover, strictly speaking, 
rejection of the I(l)-ness hypothesis should not be interpreted as acceptance of 
stationarity, because the test is not symmetric. Hence, either it should be clearly 
specified that it is believed that the debt measure is 1(1) and the usual tests run 
with the aim of providing support for this hypothesis, or different tests have to 
be used, whose null hypothesis is stationarity, e.g. tests for a unit MA root in 
the generating mechanism of the first differenced variable. We will also present 
a simple spectral based test for the latter hypothesis.
3. Cointegration tests. Focusing for example on the discounted debt ratio, we can
think of at least two alternative possibilities for applying cointegration tests in 
order to check whether the solvency condition is satisfied. Actually, from (2.8), 
dtbt is (non-) stationary if and only if either log(d,) and log(bt) .  or and
—dtst are (non-) cointegrated, in both cases with cointegration vectors equal to 
(1,1). There is again the warning that the null hypothesis of the usual tests is 
lack of cointegration, see e.g. Engle and Granger (1987), Johansen (1988). 4
4. Policy simulations. The techniques that we have described so far are extrapola­
tive, in the sense that they rely on historical data and assume that the generating 
mechanism of these data will remain unchanged in the future. Yet, economic 
policy in most EU countries has been changing, mainly in order to satisfy the 
Maastricht criteria, which have now been complemented by the more ambitious 
injunctions of the Stability and Growth Pact. Hence, we will also try to deter­
mine and comment on the likely consequences of these criteria for the validity 




























































































5. Forecasting. Apart from the infinite horizon forecast which is neccessary to 
assess the validity of the solvency condition, it is often of interest to evaluate the 
short-medium term behaviour of the debt or deficit measures. One possibility is 
to produce ARM A based forecasts for the variables of interest, but in this way 
it is not possible to take into account expected changes in policy. To do this 
requires the use of large macroeconometric models or the forecasts produced by 
official agencies, such as the OECD, IMF or EC. Uctum and Wickens (1997) 
include OECD final forecast data in their sustainability analysis. In this paper 
we assess the reliability of these (deficit) forecasts.
We conclude with two warnings. First, the derivation of the solvency condition 
relies on the assumption that the real interest rate, possibly after subtracting the 
growth rate, is positive. That this is the case is usually taken for granted, likely 
because otherwise the economy would be dynamically inefficient according to standard 
economic theory, see e.g. Diamond (1965).4 Yet, Ball et al. (1995) find that the 
average of r( — gt is slightly negative for the US, even if there are differences across 
periods, and a similar result was achieved by Mishkin (1984) for other countries. This 
implies that the government, in the presence of balanced primary budgets, could repay 
its debt without tightening fiscal policy. Second, expectations play a key role in the 
ex ante analysis o f debt behaviour, but realizations are what really matter. Hence, 
the ex ante results need not be valid ex post, even if they can provide useful insights 
on what could happen.
3. Debt ratios in EU countries
In this section we analyse the behaviour of (government) debt to gdp ratios for EU 
countries, except Greece and Luxembourg for which the OECD, our data source, does 
not provide debt figures. The exact sample ranges are indicated in the figures and 
tables; they often start in the early 70s and end in 1994. More detailed information 
on the variables involved in the analysis are contained in a data appendix which is 
available upon request. The first subsection presents a descriptive analysis o f the 4




























































































relevant variables. In the second subsection the issue of whether the debt ratios are 
stationary or not is addressed.
3.1. Descriptive analysis
The starting point is the choice of the proper debt measure to use. Most o f the previous 
studies focus on net debt, which is the relevant measure from an economic point of 
view because it takes into account the financial assets held by the Government. Yet, 
policy makers are often more interested in gross figures, e.g. the Maastricht criteria 
are in terms of gross debt. Moreover, for Denmark and Portugal only gross debt data 
are available.. Hence, when possible, we will study the behaviour of both net and 
gross debt to gdp ratios, b and gb respectively.
From figure 1, the two debt ratios present a similar evolution, which implies that 
the difference between the two debt measures has been rather stable over time, and 
of relevant size, around 20% of gdp on average. Belgium, Italy and Ireland have the 
highest ratios, but while all three ratios steeply increased up to the late '80s, the Irish 
one substantially decreased afterward, the Belgian one decreased its rate of growth, 
while the Italian one continued rising. Sweden and Finland are instead characterized 
by a negative net debt for most of the sample period, and by a rapid increase in the 
ratios in the final part o f the sample, which also takes place in Denmark, Austria, 
France and Germany, and is partly due to the consequences of the recession of the 
early ’90s on government deficits.
The rate of growth in the debt ratios is in general higher in the '80s than in the 
’70s, with the exception of Finland and, in particular, of the U.K. As we will see later 
on, the main determinant of such a pattern is the different behaviour of the interest 
and growth rates in the two periods. But the most important feature of the graphs of 
the debt ratios is that they provide very little support for a convergence of the ratios 
to zero in the long run.
So far we have used measures of debt which are available at face value, but it 
may be more appropriate to use its market value. The proper discounting requires 
premultiplying the debt figures by 1/(1 +  i), where i is the nominal interest rate on 
government debt. A  proxy for i is the ratio of net interest payments to net debt 




























































































the interest rates paid by the Government on its liabilities with those received on its 
assets. Hence, it may be more appropriate to use the ratio of gross interest payments 
to gross debt lagged one period, which is called gi. We will discount b with i and gb 
with g i , and refer to the resulting debt ratios as mb and mgb. Their behaviour is very 
similar, respectively, to that of b and gb. 5
A comparison of i and gi provides useful information on the “financial efficiency” 
of the Government. Actually, it can be easily shown that when i is higher than gi the 
government is paying a higher average interest rate on its liabilities than it receives 
on its assets. From the graphs in figure 1, this seems to be the case for Austria, the 
Netherlands, and UK in the final part of the sample. The reverse relationship is more 
reasonable and reflects the lower risk premium that the government has to pay (and, 
the use by the government of zero coup on financial instruments). Actually, both i 
and gi are lower on average than market rates.
Several authors have also suggested discounting the debt measure back to the 
beginning of the sample period. In the case of the debt to gdp ratio, the proper 
discount factor is d in equation 2.9. To construct the required difference between the 
real rate of interest and the real growth rate (r — g), we can subtract the nominal 
rate of growth, ng , from either i or gi. We use i — ng to discount mb, and gi — ng 
to discount mgb. The resulting measures are labelled dmb and dmgb. The alternative 
definitions of the debt ratio that we have introduced so far are summarised in table 1.
5There are problems in the calculation o f i for those countries which experience a negative net 
debt in some periods. In fact, the net interest payments are sometimes positive in the same periods, 
reflecting an inefficient financial managament and/or measurement errors. In these cases we have 




























































































Table 1: Alternative definitions of the debt ratio
Notice that d is a proper discount factor only if r — g is positive, otherwise d is 
larger than one and increasing in time. This is also the condition that ensures that 
the forward solution of the equation which governs the evolution of the debt ratio 
(equation 2.8) is not explosive. As we mentioned in the previous section, this is often 
an untested assumption in empirical analyses on debt sustainability. Yet. the graphs 
in figure 1 show that the real rate of interest was higher than growth in most countries 
during the ’70s, sometimes also in the early ’80s, and for Spain. Ireland and Finland 
for most of the sample period.
In this case, and in the presence of a balanced primary budget, the debt ratio can 
decrease without any need for restrictive fiscal policy, as can be immediately derived 
from equation 2.8, and eventually converges to zero. In fact, the ratio started decreas­
ing in several countries in the early ’70s, e.g. Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
But then it remained rather stable or even increased. This is consistent with the fact 
that governments ran budget deficits, mainly in order to offset the negative effects 
of the two oil crises and the related recessions, which more than cancelled out the 
beneficial effects of low real interest rates.
The situation changed in the ’80s, when r — g become positive in several countries, 
and this helps to explain the aforementioned higher growth of the debt ratio in this 
subperiod. It seems reasonable to regard the ’70s as a rather particular period and 
thus to assume that r — g will remain positive in the future. Thus, the forward 
solution of equation 2.8 is stable, and whether solvency holds remains an issue. The 




























































































if the discounted debt ratios start decreasing in the final part of the sample in some 
countries.
3.2. Is there a unit root?
In Section 2 we provided formulae which describe the evolution of (possibly discounted) 
debt ratios conditional on the behaviour of interest and growth rates, and of primary 
deficits. The solvency condition requires convergence to zero of the expected value 
of the debt ratio. Such an expected value can be also obtained from a univariate 
representation of the debt ratio, namely, one where the evolution of the ratio only 
depends on its own lags. Let us consider for simplicity the model
bt =  c -f 4>bt-\ +  £t, £t ~i . i . d . (0,<J£). (3.1)
If 0  =  1, it is
E(bt+n) =  bt +  cn,
so that the expected value diverges linearly if c ^  0, or is equal to the current debt 
ratio if c =  0.6 Thus, |0| <  1 is a necessary condition for solvency. It is not suffi­
cient, because c =  0 must also hold for the expected value to converge to zero. It can 
be easily demonstrated that these conditions are also valid for more general univari­
ate generating mechanisms, and this explains the interest in the literature in testing 
whether there is an autoregressive unit root in the generating mechanism of the debt 
ratio.
In order to test for such an hypothesis, we start by applying the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests, whose null hypothesis is that 0 = 1 ,  i.e., that the solvency 
condition is not satisfied. We include a constant in the regression and up to four 
lags, when the coefficient of the highest lag must be significant according to a t- 
test. Usually only one or two lags are necessary, which is coherent with the annual 
frequency of the data, but the results appear to be robust to the choice of the lag
6When <f> >  1, divergence is even explosive but this case is usually ruled out a priori in economic 
applications. In our case it would happen, for example, if the difference between the real interest and 
growth rate were constant and positive, and the deficits deviated randomly from a constant, as can 
be derived from equation 2.8. From an empirical point o f view, we never found autoregressive roots 
larger than one, even if there were a few spurious cases where they were due to a different behaviour 




























































































length and to whether the constant is present or not. We also check that the resulting 
residuals are uncorrelated, homoskedastic and normally distributed, which are the 
required conditions for the statistic to be the maximum likelihood test for a unit root. 
These hypotheses are usually accepted, and when they are not we have modified the 
models by including additional lags or dummy variables in order to evaluate whether 
the result of the unit root test changed, but in most cases it did not.
In Table 2 we report the ADF tests for b, gb, dmb, dmgb, run on the basic autore­
gressive models, together with the chosen lag length and the sample period.7 For none 
of the countries and debt ratio measures can the hypothesis of a unit root be rejected. 
The estimated values of the root are often higher than 0.9, which is coherent with the 
slowly decaying autocorrelation functions whose starting values are also often above 
0.9. Hence, the alternative to a unit root should be a root very close to one. but the 
power of the test in discriminating between these two possibilities is very low.
A  rather subtle issue is whether the parameters of the models are stable in time. 
Usual statistical techniques for testing for such an hypothesis are hardly applicable in 
our context because of the small sample size which, e.g., makes recursive estimation 
often infeasible or unreliable. As an alternative, structural breaks could be imposed a 
priori. In particular, from the graphs in figure 1 to 4, the hypothesis of a segmented 
trend in the generating mechanism of the debt ratios could be a plausible alternative 
to that of a unit root for several series, e.g., it could capture the change in the growth 
rate of the debt ratios due to the reversal o f the relationship between real interest 
and growth rates. Yet, the implementation of tests to distinguish between the two 
hypotheses (e.g. Perron (1989)) is not particularly interesting in our context, because 
both of them imply that the debt ratios grow linearly, so that solvency could not be 
satisfied.
We now exploit cointegration theory to provide additional evidence on whether the 
debt ratios are stationary or not. The debt ratio can be decomposed into
bt =  (1 +  rt -  gt)bt- i  -  st. (3.2)
7The results for mb and mgb are very close to those for b and gb and are not reported to save 
space. The values for net ratios are close to those in table 1 o f Uctum and Wickens (1997) who 





























































































Thus, cointegration between ut =  (l+ ?-( - gt)bt- i  and vt =  - s t is a necessary condition 
for the debt ratio to be stationary, while a cointegration vector equal to (1,1) is also 
sufficient. Moreover, from the definition of the discounted debt ratio and invariance 
of stationarity to the logarithmic transformation, the discounted ratio is stationary if 
and only if yt =  log(dt/ ( l  +  it)) and wt =  logfy are cointegrated with cointegration 
vector equal to (1,1).
The maximum likelihood statistics suggested by Johansen (1988, 1991, 1995) allow 
us to test these hypotheses. Notice that the null hypotheses of his trace and A—max 
statistics are no cointegration, i.e., that solvency does not hold. The starting point 
for the construction of the tests is the specification of a VAR model for the variables, 
whose residuals are uncorrelated, homoskedastic and normally distributed. In our 
case, VARs with one or two lags and an unrestricted constant usually satisfy these 
requirements and therefore provide a proper framework for cointegration testing. The 
results are reported in table 3, where gu, gv, gy and gw  are defined as u. v, y and w 
but using gross variables.8
W ith respect to unit root tests, the results from cointegration tests for the undis­
counted debt ratios are the same; for all countries the null hypothesis that they are 
integrated cannot be rejected, possibly with the exception of Finland. Actually, the 
hypothesis that the cointegration vector is (1,1) is rejected, even if cointegration is 
often accepted. This is mainly due to stationarity of the primary surplus, i.e. the 
cointegration vector is (0,1). Instead, for the discounted measures there are some dif­
ferences. Discounted net debt ratios appear to be stationary for Belgium, Spain and, 
marginally, Italy, and gross ratios for Austria, Belgium, U.K., and the Netherlands.
The different outcomes may be due to the fact that cointegration tests are ap­
plied to the logarithms of the ratios, while unit root tests are referred to their levels.
8Notice that the equivalent o f equation (3.2) for discounted variables is:
d tb t  =  d t (  1  +  —  g t )b t~  i  —  bt s t  =  d t~ i b t - i  —  d t s t .
Thus, we cannot test for cointegration between dt- ib t- i  and dts t with the Johansen procedure, 
because the equation for d t-ib t-i  in a VAR would be the identity
— d t - 2 b t ~ 2  — d t - \ 8 t^ \ .




























































































Whether logs or levels are used is irrelevant asymptotically, but it can be important 
in small samples. In order to evaluate whether this is the case, we ran ADF tests 
for the logs of the discounted debt ratios, with results that agree with those from the 
cointegration tests. Hence, the logarithmic transformation matters and, given that we 
are interested in the levels of the ratios, where conclusions differ it seems safer to rely 
on the ADF tests.
The null hypothesis of the test statistics that we have used so far is that solvency 
does not hold. Because of the available small sample size and the persistence of the 
variables, the power of the tests is rather low, so that the null hypothesis is likely to be 
accepted even if it is not true. This suggests that in order to have a fair evaluation of 
whether the debt ratios are stationary or not, we should also apply tests that maintain 
stationarity as the null hypothesis. For example, from the ADF regressions, the null 
hypothesis that the highest autoregressive root is 0.9 can always be accepted. But 
the choice of the stationary value of the root to be tested for is arbitrary. As an 
alternative, we recall that differencing a stationary series will induce a unit moving 
average root in the generating mechanism of the first differenced variable. Hence, we 
can test for stationarity of the debt ratio by testing for a unit moving average root in 
the generating mechanism of its first difference.
Unfortunately, the distribution of the likelihood ratio test for this hypothesis has 
not been derived so far, while Lagrange multiplier tests (e.g. Tanaka (1990), Saikkonen 
and Lukkonen (1993)) are rather complex and their small sample performance still has 
to be thoroughly evaluated. Thus, we adopt a simpler procedure which is based on 
the observation that the spectrum at frequency zero of a variable has to be equal to 
zero if there is a unit moving average root in its generating mechanism. In table 4 
we report estimates of the spectrum at frequency zero with standard errors, using the 
Bartlett kernel and setting the bandwith at double the square root of the number of 
observations. Similar results are obtained with the Tukey and Parzen kernels, and 
with different values of the bandwith. Even if the distribution of the estimator is 
not exactly normal, for all the variables the value zero always falls well within the 
95% confidence interval based on the normal distributution (estimated value ±  1.96 
* standard error). We think that this provides reliable evidence that if stationarity is 




























































































In summary, there is substantial uncertainty on whether the debt ratios are sta­
tionary or not. Fortunately, an exact answer to this question is not necessary for our 
aim, and the reason for this statement is the role of the constant term. The t-statistics 
for its significance in the ADF regressions, which are quite often based on congruent 
univariate representations of the variables, are also reported in Table 2. The critical 
values are different under the hypotheses of integration and stationarity, higher in the 
former case (see Dickey and Fuller (1981)). With few exceptions, the constant is not 
significant if it is accepted that the debt ratio is non stationary, while it is significant 
if the debt ratio is stationary. In both cases the implication is that the ratio will 
converge to a constant value, but not to zero, and therefore solvency can be expected 
not to hold.
4. Solvency and the Maastricht Criteria
So far we have used historical data to make inferences on whether the debt ratio will 
converge to zero or not. This provided useful information, but it is also important to 
take into account expectations of the future behaviour of the variables, which mainly 
reflect announced changes in fiscal policy. Uctum and Wickens (1997) report OECD 
forecasts for net debt ratios up to the year 2000, and these in general show a decline 
in the ratios, in particular for those countries whose ratio was over 60% in 1994, or at 
least a non marked increase9.
This is probably the result of the fiscal requirements in the Maastricht Treaty, 
and in particular o f the deficit and debt ratios ceilings. Actually, we can rewrite the 
equation for the evolution of the gross debt ratio as
gb, -  gbt_i =  {gitgb,^l -  gst) -  ngtgbt_x, (4.1)
where the term in parentheses is the gross deficit ratio, drt =  gitgbt_i — gst, and ng 
is the nominal rate o f growth. If dr is set equal to 0.03 (the 3% of gdp), real growth 
to 0.03, and inflation to 0.02 (so that ng =  0.05), the equilibrium value o f the gross
9Actually, there is a suggestion in the data that the 60% debt ratio has become an attractor', 
both for high ratio and low ratio countries. A model rationalizing this behaviour can be found in 




























































































debt ratio is 0.6 (i.e. 60% of gdp), which coincides with the Maastricht requirement.10 
Countries that start with a higher debt ratio will experience a gradual reduction 
toward this value, while there can be an increase in low ratio countries, unless their 
deficit ratio is lower than 0.03, e.g. because of the lower interest payments burden.
If the ratio of government assets to gdp remains constant, a similar pattern will 
emerge for net debt, which is in fact coherent with the OECD forecasts. Instead, if 
the real interest rate is even only marginally higher than real growth, the discount 
factor will converge to zero, and this will also drive the discounted debt ratios toward 
this value.
Of course these results are sensitive to changes in the forecasts of inflation, growth, 
real interest rates, and the primary deficit ratio. Inflation plays a minor role because, 
apart from minor receipts from seigniorage, higher nominal interest rates are com­
pensated by higher nominal growth. Higher real interest rates do not also affect the 
evolution of the debt ratio if the deficit ratio remains the same, but this requires 
lower primary deficits or higher surpluses. Otherwise they lead to an increase in the 
equilibrium ratio. Instead, lower growth always exerts a negative effect through the 
term ngtgbt- i ,  and it can also lead to a temporary relaxation of the deficit criterion, 
according to the rules set up in the Treaty. While higher interest rates and lower 
growth have a negative effect on the debt ratio, they speed up the convergence to zero 
o f the discount factor, and of the discounted ratio, notwithstanding the increase in 
the raw figures. Finally, higher primary deficit ratios are possible in the presence of 
lower interest payments; otherwise they will lead to an increase in the debt ratio.
In summary, the Maastricht criteria are compatible with .a constant debt ratio 
and, under rather plausible assumptions about the average future behaviour of the 
variables, the equilibrium value coincides with the debt ratio criterion. Thus, solvency 
is not implied by the Maastricht criteria if the debt ratio is undiscounted, while if it is 
discounted solvency can be expected to hold. The zero medium run deficit requirement 
o f the Stability and Growth Pact clearly implies more. Since the deficit is interest- 
inclusive, maintenance of the target will imply, on average, primary deficit surpluses 
and hence a reduction towards zero in the debt ratio, discounted or not.
10This consistency has been pointed out elsewhere (e.g. in Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1992)) 






























































































The previous sections mainly dealt with long/medium horizon forecasts of the debt 
ratio, but short term forecasts are also of interest. Their reliability depends on that 
of the determinants of the evolution of the debt ratio, dr and ng from equation (4.1). 
Artis (1989, 1997) analyses official forecasts from IMF and OECD for growth and 
inflation, and concludes that they are in general quite accurate for EU countries, 
which implies that ng in (4.1) can also be accurately forecast11. In this section we 
evaluate the reliability of gross deficit ratio forecasts, d r f,  which is also interesting 
per se, given the considerable relevance that the deficit ratio has for economic policy.
We focus on OECD forecasts, which is coherent with our choice of analysing OECD 
data on debt ratios, and consider year-ahead and current year forecasts, d rfya  and 
d rfc  respectively. Year-ahead forecasts are identified with those published in the 
OECD’s Economic Outlook for December of year t for t+1, whilst current-year fore­
casts are those made in the June issue of the Economic Outlook in year t for year 
t. They are compared with first released actual data on gloss deficit ratios. Such a 
comparison is the most interesting from a policy perspective, and further revisions of 
actual data usually do not affect the results, see e.g. Artis (1989). We analyse coun­
tries for which at least ten forecasts are available, namely, all EU countries except 
Ireland and Portugal.
The year ahead and current year forecasts errors, eya =  d rfya  — d r f  and ec =  
d r fc  —d r f  respectively, are graphed in figure 2. The mean error (ME), mean absolute 
error (M AE) and root mean squared error (RMSE) are reported in Tables 5 and 6. 
On average the MAE is about 1%; the worst performance is for Finland, Norway, 
Sweden and Greece with around 2% MAE. The values for the MEs are smaller and 
negative, which implies that on average the actual values for these countries were 
under-predicted, but also that there were periods of substantial over-prediction. A c­
tually, from the graphs of the forecast errors, it appears that under-prediction in 
the ’80s was followed by over-prediction in the '90s. Such a pattern, in particular 
over-prediction in the ’90s, seems to be also present for other countries, e.g. Aus­
tria, Belgium, Denmark, France and Spain. Such an asymmetric pattern could be *
n ln fact, there is some evidence that as errors in real growth and inflation forecasts are negatively 




























































































due to the introduction of the Maastricht Criteria, which may have increased the loss 
associated with underprediction of the gross deficit ratio.
A  comparison of the RMSEs for current year and year ahead forecasts indicates that 
the former are smaller than the latter for all countries, suggesting that the additional 
six months’ information is indeed useful in forecasting the deficit ratios. MAEs are 
also smaller for current year forecasts, while the results on MEs are somewhat mixed. 
Again, the highest RMSEs are for Finland, Norway, Sweden and Greece.
We now formally analyse the unbiasedness and weak efficiency of the forecasts. It 
is conventional to claim that the forecasts are unbiased when otg =  0, cti =  1 in the 
regression
drh =  a 0 +  cnyh +  uA, (5.1)
where y  is either d rfya  or d rfc, and u is an error term that under the null hypothesis of 
unbiasedness coincides with the forecast error (see, e.g., Clements and Hendry (1997a, 
Ch.3)). Yet, Holden and Peel (1990) showed that this condition is sufficient but not 
necessary for unbiasedness, and suggested to substitute for it the condition /?0 =  0 in 
the regression
Xh =  Po +  vh, (5.2)
where x  is either eya or ec, and v is the demeaned forecast error. As is well known, 
weak efficiency instead requires the forecast error to be uncorrelated in time (see, e.g., 
Clements and Hendry (1997a, Ch.3)).
Table 7 reports, for year ahead and current year forecasts, the Wald test (W )  
for cio =  0, c*i =  1, which is distributed as x 2(2), the t-test (T ) for (do =  0 and two 
Lagrange Multiplier tests (LI and L2) for lack of first and second order autocorrelation 
in the forecast errors, which are distributed as F (\ ,H  — 1) and F (2 ,H  — 2), where 
H  is the number of available forecasts. The main result is that for both year ahead 
and current year forecasts unbiasedness is rejected for most countries by the W  test, 
with the exception of Belgium, France, UK, Spain and Sweden. Yet, when the T  test 
is applied, unbiasedness is accepted for many more countries. Even if this is possible 
from a theoretical perspective, such a remarkable mismatch between the T  and W  
tests is likely due to the small sample size. Another warning for the interpretation 
o f the results is that the graph of the forecast errors suggested a possible change of 




























































































but the Hansen (1992) tests for parameter stability in the regressions (5.1) and (5.2) 
accept this hypothesis. As far as weak efficiency is concerned, it seems to hold for 
all the countries, apart from UK for the year ahead forecasts and Denmark for the 
current year forecasts.
Finally, we have compared the OECD forecasts with those from two naive models, 
a random walk without drift (which implies that the optimal forecast of dr/, is drh_i), 
and a deterministic trend model.12 The last two columns of Tables 5 and 6 report 
the Theil statistics for the two models (7T and T2 respectively), which in this case 
simply coincide with the ratio of the RMSE for the OECD forecasts to that of the 
naive forecasts. Thus, for example, a value of T1 smaller than one indicates that the 
OECD forecasts outperform the random walk forecasts on the basis of the RMSE.
The results are rather surprising: for the year-ahead forecasts the naive models lead 
to a smaller RMSE for all countries, apart from Denmark and Sweden. For the current 
year forecasts there is a marked improvement in OECD forecast performance, but there 
are still several countries where they are outperformed by the simpler alternatives. A 
possible explanation for such an outcome is that both alternative forecasts are quite 
robust to structural changes, even if they are less efficient when no changes take place 
(see Clements and Hendry (1997b)). This result also suggests that there could be 
benefits in terms of lower RMSE from pooling the OECD forecasts with the naive 
forecasts. Such a possibility, together with the usefulness of intercept corrections, the 
role of asymmetric loss functions and a comparison with the forecasting performance 
of IMF and the European Commission, is considered in a separate paper, Artis and 
Marcellino (1997).
In summary, the OECD forecasts for the gross deficit ratio are rather accurate for 
most EU countries, even if it could be possible to further improve them. When com­
bined with the good performance in forecasting inflation and growth (Artis (1989)), 
this implies that accurate short horizon gross debt ratio forecasts can also be con­
structed, by means of the formula in equation (4.1).
l2Fewer forecast errors are available for the deterministic forecasts because the parameters of the 
model have to be estimated. We have regressed the first five actual values on a constant and a trend, 
and used the estimated parameters to  forecast the sixth observation. Both the estimates and the 





























































































Accurate forecasts of the future behaviour of government debt and deficits are one of 
the most important ingredients for rational economic policy making. In this paper 
we have focused on time-series based infinite horizon tests of the solvency of EU 
government finances as reflected in the behaviour of their debt to gdp ratios over the 
last two to three decades. Solvency is inherently a forward-looking concept, however, 
and there is evidence that, under the prompting of the Maastricht criteria fiscal policy 
has begun to change. In fact, our results are consistent with a realization of stable 
debt /G D P  ratios in line with those criteria; but this does not guarantee solvency 
and may not be good enough. In the framework of monetary union, where individual 
governments no longer have the possibility of using their former money-creating powers 
to underpin the credibility of their promises to repay, it is not clear that governments 
can sell over debts with the ease that they could assume before. Indeed, it is evident 
that the Stability and Growth Pact has more ambitious aims than the Maastricht 
Treaty; if realized, they would be fully consistent with solvency under the conditions 
normally supposed in standard economic theory.
The selection of the countries to participate in the European Monetary Union will 
rely on an interpretation of whether the fiscal achievements evident in the 1997 data 
that will be available at the time of the examination are durable or not. Short term 
forecasts are particularly important in this connection. Our examination of those 
forecasts suggests that they are of reasonable quality and therefore can provide a 
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T able  2a: U nit R o o t  T ests -  A ustria , B elg ium , D en m ark , F in lan d
Country b dmb gb dmgb
Austria ADF test -0.66 -1.50 -0.04 -2.35
t-test const. 1.59 1.83 1.67 3.73**
lags 1 1 1 1
sample 1981-1994 1981-1994 1971-1994 1972-1994
Belgium ADF test -1.03 -2.19 -1.21 -1.98
t-test const. 1.46 2.20 1.52 1.87
lags 2 2 2 2
sample 1972-1994 1972-1994 1972-1994 1973-1994
Denmark ADF test — — -3.02 -2.33
t-test const. 3.27* 1.81
lags 1 1
sample 1981-1994 1983-1994
Finland ADF test -2.03 -1.80 -1.55 -1.49
t-test const. -1.92 -2.09 1.56 1.65
lags 2 3 2 2
sample 1972-1994 1973-1994 1972-1990 1972-1990
* and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels.
Critical values for ADF tests from MacKinnon (1991).




























































































T ab le  2b: U nit R o o t  T ests - France, G erm any, Ireland, Ita ly
Country b dmb gb dmgb
France ADF test -0.11 — -0.12 -2.31
t-test const. 1.83 0.36 2.60
lags 1 1 1
sample 1980-1992 1980-1992 1980-1992
Germany ADF test -0.61 — -0.41 -1.11
t-test const. 4.66 1.07 1.77
lags 1 2 2
sample 1963-1990 1962-1990 1963-1990
Ireland ADF test -1.77 -2.39 — —
t-test const. 2.05 2.52
lags 1 2
sample 1975-1994 1979-1994
Italy ADF test -1.82<°> -3.02<°> -0.73(“) -2.66
t-test const. 1.23 -2.58 0.27 3.31*
lags 1 5 1 1
sample 1965-1994 1975-1994 1965-1994 1981-1994
* and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels.
Critical values for ADF tests from MacKinnon (1991).
Critical values for (one-sided) t-test for constant from Dickey and Fuller (1981). 




























































































T ab le  2c: U nit R o o t  T ests -  N etherlands, P ortu ga l, S pain , Sw eden , U .K .
Country b dmb gi> dmgb
Netherlands ADF test -0.82 -1.43 -1.71 -0.91
t-test const. 0.95 1.24 1.85 0.86
lags 1 1 2 2
sample 1971-1994 1971-1994 1972-1994 1972-1994




Spain ADF test -5.90*’  (o) -1.27<“> — —
t-test const. -5.72" -1.71
lags 4 1
sample 1980-1994 1977-1993
Sweden ADF test -1.70 — -1.46 -2.24
t-test const. 0.26 1.67 2.15
lags 2 2 2
sample 1973-1994 1972-1994 1982-1994
U.K. ADF test -1.83 -1.73 -2.24 -2.79
t-tes const. 1.69 1.71 2.34 2.83
lags 2 2 2 2
sample 1972-1994 1973-1994 1972-1994 1973-1994
* and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels.
Critical values for ADF tests from MacKinnon (1991).
Critical values for (one-sided) t-test for constant from Dickey and Fuller (1981). 




























































































T ab le  3a: C o in tegra tion  T ests - A ustria , B elgium , D en m ark , F inland
Country u ,v y,w gu,gv gy.gw
Austria A-max test 39.86“ 6.86 18.4* 35.42"
Trace test 40.47“ 9.54 19.98” 39.11**
c.v. =  (1,1) 39.11” — 16.78“ 1.16
lags 1 1 1 2
sample 1982-1994 1981-1994 1973-1994 1973-1994
Belgium A-max test 8.62 17.93* 7.85 11.00
Trace test 10.27 26.88** 9.69 18.61*
c.v. =  (1,1) — 0.11 — 3.33
lags 2 2 2 2
sample 1973-1994 1972-1994 1973-1994 1973-1994
Denmark A-max test — — 47.53** 7.91
Trace test 58.2** 9.11
c.v. =  (1,1) 36.58“ —
lags 1 1
sample 1982-1994 1982-1994
Finland A-max test 9.88 — 25.16” 20.76”
Trace test 19.03* 25.31" 24.10“
c.v. =  (1,1) 0.02 25.01“ 12.41"
lags 2 2 2
sample 1972-1994 1963-1994 1963-1994
" and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels. 




























































































T a b le  3b : C oin tegra tion  T ests -  France, G erm any, Ireland , Ita ly
Country u ,v y ,w gu ,gv gy,gw
France A-max test — — 36.52** 25.5”
Trace test 37.67“ 25.82"
c.v. =  (1,1) 30.34" 7.89"
lags 1 1
sample 1979-1994 1979-1994
Germany A-max test — — 12.50 6.08
Trace test 12.51 10.37
c.v. =  (1,1) — —
lags 2 2
sample 1963-1994 1963-1994
Ireland A-max test 37.04” 39.83” — —
Trace test 41.57" 46.31”
c.v. =  (1,1) 32.51” 31.22”
lags 1 1
sample 1979-1994 1979-1994
Italy A-max test 24.25” 17.29* 23.2” 19.49**
Trace test 24.93” 18.30* 23.23” 19.7*
c.v. =  (1,1) 20.26” 3.32 22.85” 9.79"
lags 1 2 1 1
sample 1966-1994 1972-1994 1981-1994 1981-1994
* and ’ * indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels. 




























































































T ab le  3c: C o in tegra tion  T ests -  N etherlands, Spain , Sw eden, U .K .
Country u ,v y,w gu,gv gy,gw
Netherlands A-max test 72.38" 11.61 10.77 25.06"
Trace test 72.84" 12.08 17.59* 29.15"
c.v. =  (1,1) 69.22" — 1.56 0.73
lags 1 2 2 1
sample 1972-1994 1972-1994 1979-1994 1978-1994
Spain A-max test CO CO O 29.20" — —
Trace test 39.02" 31.57"
c.v. =  (1,1) 38.87" 0.57
lags 1 1
sample 1978-1993 1977-1993
Sweden A-max test — — 51.21" 3.70
Trace test 57.31” 5.94
c.v. =  (1, 1) 44.15" —
lags 1 1
sample 1981-1994 1981-1994
U.K. A-max test 6.70 10.31 9.03 11.42
Trace test 8.78 14.01 12.62 20.82"
c.v. =  (1,1) — — — 0.39
lags 2 2 2 2
sample 1973-1994 1973-1994 1973-1994 1973-1994
* and ”  indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels. 












































































































b dmb gb dmgb
0.56 (0.47) 0.73 (0.64) 0.93 (0.69) 2.30 (1.75)
2.52 (1.88) 4.11 (3.07) 2.64 (1.97) 4.53 (3.45)
1.13 (0.99) 1.16 (1.05)
1.33 (0.91) 1.35 (1.01) 2.25 (1.54) 1.43 (1.00)
1.65 (1.23) 0.91 (0.72) 1.22 (0.99)
1.26 (0.87) 1.06 (0.73) 1.07 (0.94)
2.03 (1.49) 3.18 (2.51)
0.40 (0.27) 2.21 (1.65) 1.73 (1.15) 1.81 (1.58)
0.62 (0.46) 0.52 (0.39) 3.71 (2.77) 3.79 (3.01)
0.48 (0.36)
0.72 (0.55) 1.58 (1.25)
1.36 (0.99) 0.77 (0.57) 1.13 (0.98)
1.04 (0.78) 1.94 (1.47) 0.77 (0.58) 1.13 (0.87)



























































































T ab le  5: O E C D  F orecasts - Y ear A h ea d
Country M A E M E R M S E T1 T2 Sample
Austria 1.06 0.45 1.25 1.18 1.39 1983-1995
Belgium 0.85 0.02 1.06 0.89 1.30 1983-1995
Denmark 1.62 -0.63 1.95 0.92 0.70 1983-1995
Finland 2.35 -1.81 2.96 1.00 1.05 1985-1995
France 1.02 0.09 1.22 1.28 1.22 1977-1995
Germany 0.97 -0.48 1.18 1.09 1.20 1977-1995
Greece 2.21 -0.74 2.62 1.15 1.30 1985-1995
Italy 1.36 -0.17 1.72 1.46 1.49 1978-1995
Netherlands 1.22 -0.95 1.44 1.32 2.52 1983-1995
Norway 3.27 -1.73 3.73 1.79 2.09 1983-1995
Spain 1.32 0.61 1.56 1.06 1.30 1985-1995
Sweden 2.56 -0.16 3.17 0.92 0.64 1985-1995




























































































T ab le  6: O E C D  F orecasts -  C urrent Y ear
Country M A E M E R M SE T1 T2 Sample
Austria 0.94 0.68 1.10 1.04 1.23 1982-1995
Belgium 0.59 -0.09 0.74 0.62 0.90 1982-1995
Denmark 0.91 -0.19 1.05 0.49 0.38 1982-1995
Finland 2.39 -2.23 2.78 0.94 0.98 1984-1995
France 0.55 -0.20 0.70 0.74 0.70 1976-1995
Germany 0.80 -0.42 0.98 0.90 1.00 1975-1995
Greece 1.98 -1.27 2.38 1.04 1.17 1984-1995
Italy 0.98 -0.49 1.24 1.05 1.07 1978-1995
Netherlands 0.88 -0.42 1.12 1.03 1.95 1982-1995
Norway 2.48 -2.12 3.22 1.55 1.80 1983-1995
Spain 1.20 0.33 1.46 0.99 1.21 1984-1995
Sweden 1.59 -0.24 2.06 0.60 0.42 1983-1995




























































































T ab le  7: O E C D  F orecasts -  W eak  E fficiency  an d  U nbiasedness T ests
Country W Y T Y LIY L2Y W C TC L1C L2C
Austria 7.16* 1.32 0.02 0.31 11.69" 2.89” 0.02 0.56
Belgium 1.77 0.07 0.30 0.61 2.34 -0.42 1.54 2.02
Denmark 8.21* -1.18 3.37 1.67 3.70 -0.65 4.94* 2.32
Finland 12.16** -2.44* 2.32 1.03 29.98** -4.42** 1.91 0.87
France 2.79 0.31 2.18 2.52 1.79 -1.28 0.29 0.42
Germany 27.66** -1.88 0.00 0.01 28.69** -2.15* 0.12 0.31
Greece 14.13** -0.92 0.14 0.66 12.51” -2.08* 0.55 0.27
Italy 17.54” -0.41 0.00 3.58 12.00** -1.78 1.09 0.80
Netherlands 39.77” -3.08” 0.78 0.60 8.58* -1.46 0.02 0.12
Norway 7.41* -1.82 1.97 0.95 9.55" -3.02" 4.24 5.07“
Spain 4.02 1.34 0.07 0.16 3.73 0.77 0.26 0.48
Sweden 0.34 -0.03 2.27 2.79 0.29 -0.43 0.48 0.39
U.K. 2.31 0.71 4.87* 2.96 3.54 0.11 1.38 0.67
* and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels.
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